Madhu falls to Security Forces without single bullet
being fired:
Friday’s explosion a cover to crushing defeats

The Security Forces and the LTTE fought fiercely to take the upper
hand in the ongoing battles in the Wanni and in the North hitting banner
headlines in the media in a more competitive manner.
Though Security Forces strictly confined its battle into the Northern
battlefront securing victories against the Tiger outfit even under
difficult circumstances, the LTTE once again exhibited its inability to
tolerate its defeats shifting the theatre of war to the South.
The LTTE once again killed more than two dozens of innocent
civilians, who were on their way back home after a heavy day’s work in a
jam-packed bus, which started its journey from Piliyandala heading
towards Kahapola on Friday evening and injuring several dozens more
civilians including school children returning home after tuition
classes.
Initial investigations confirmed that the bomb had been placed on the
parcel rack of the bus three seats behind the driver’s seat.
Fall of Madhu
The incident took place at a time the Southern populace was
witnessing vicissitudes in the battlefronts. The troops accomplished one
of its highest achievements in the Wanni battlefront taking the sacred
Madhu Church under the Security Forces fold without firing a single
bullet within this holly land.
The troops also challenged the Forward Defence Line (FDL) of the LTTE
in Jaffna ahead of Security Forces defences in Muhamalai and Kilali.

But it was under different circumstances the Security Forces achieved
these victories. It was after hundreds of soldiers sacrificing their
lives and nearly 300 sustaining injuries the troops were able to push
back the Tiger defences in Jaffna further towards the south of Jaffna
peninsula.
Securing control over the Madhu Church area took place under a
completely different scenario without a firing a single bullet against
the LTTE within this holy land.
Consequently the LTTE in its usual pattern created yet another blood
bath in the South to achieve multiple objectives.
First, it was aimed at covering up its humiliating defeat in the
Jaffna battlefront losing one of its most valued Defence Lines, which
stood as a huge wall against the Security Forces advance into
Kilinochchi district and the Madhu Church area which they wanted under
their control forever.
Second, the LTTE used this incident to change the mind set of the
southern populace at a time they were witnessing nearly hundred soldiers
losing their lives in the battlefront while witnessing the hospitals
filled with hundreds of wounded soldiers.
Therefore it was an opportunity for the LTTE to give yet another
shock to the southern population to provoke them to raise their voice
against the Government’s military strategy to defeat the LTTE.
Unleashing terror
Once again it was yet another attempt by the Tiger outfit to convince
that they are still capable of unleashing terror acts in the South
despite their humiliating defeats in the North.
The LTTE also expected to exert pressure on the Government, both
politically and internationally to give up its military strategy against
the Tiger outfit especially aiming at the forthcoming Eastern Provincial
Council elections.
Therefore, citizens of this country will be able to observe what
would be the repercussions of a series of events unfolding in the
Northern battlefront in the coming weeks.
But the whole events unfolded within this week can be seen as a part
of a competition between the military strategies of the Security Forces
and the LTTE.
It was on Tuesday morning that Army Commander Lt. General Sarath
Fonseka flew to Palaly Security Forces Headquarters to observe the
ground situation there in the Jaffna peninsula after one Armed Personnel
Carrier was hit by Tiger fire in the Muhamali FDL Monday afternoon.
It is learnt that the Army Commander’s visit to Jaffna was intended
to brief the field commanders about future plans for the Jaffna
peninsula.
It was just 14 hours after the Army Commander’s visit to Palaly the
Security Forces decided to advance from Muhamalai and Kilaly from the
North and South of the A-9 road amidst intelligence reports that Tigers
were mobilising their cadres into the FDL.
The troops of the 55 Division under the command of Brigadier Kamal
Gunaratne and the 53 Division, the prime offensive Division of the Sri
Lanka Army under the command of Brigadier Samantha Sooriyabandara were
given the task of advancing into the Tiger FDL. It was around 2 am in
the morning that they were given the task to break into first Defence
Line of the LTTE.
The troops of the 55 Division advanced from Muhamalai to Kadolana
while troops of the 53 Division advanced from Kilali to Muhamalai.
Their advance into the Tiger FDL was hindered by booby-traps of the
Tigers. By the first light of day the troops were able to reach the
first line of the Tiger FDL and capture it pushing back the cadres
dominating the first line. In this assault more than 50 per cent of the
Tiger cadres were reportedly killed as confirmed by the intercepted
radio transmissions.
However, there was no strong resistance from the LTTE towards the
advancing troops. It was due to booby-traps and anti-personnel (AP)
mines the advance of the troops of the 53 Division to the Tiger FDL was
delayed. The delay on the part of the 53 Division became an advantageous
point to the troops.
According to ground sources, troops went ahead of the first line of
the LTTE and captured their second line too amidst severe resistance
from the LTTE. The Tiger cadres holding the second line too had
withdrawn from the line.
The ground troops were supported by the artillery, mortar and Multi
Barrel Rocket launcher fire on the Tiger positions and by the close air
cover by the MI 24 gunship helicopters.
It was around 10 am in the morning that the Tiger resistance
increased with heavy fighting breaking out in the Tiger FDLs. The number
of artillery and mortar rounds falling into the Tiger second line
increased by 11.30 a.m. as troops detected 82 Tiger artillery and mortar
locations in their mortar detector radars.
The Security Forces too launched rains of artillery and mortar rounds
into the Tiger locations to prevent reinforcements arriving into the
Tiger FDLs from the South of the Jaffna peninsula. The air raids on two
Tiger artillery gun positions silenced them in the Soranpattu area south
of Muhamalai.
The troops dominating the second line of the LTTE by this time faced
severe resistance as the LTTE had registered artillery and mortar on
their heads.
It was around 12.30 in the afternoon that the field commanders
decided to withdraw the troops from the second line of the LTTE and
position them close to the first Tiger defence line as dominating either
of the Tiger FDLs was detrimental for the troops as the LTTE had
registered artillery in to their defences very accurately.
New FDL
The decision came as troops faced a difficult situation as they could
not create a supply link to the second line due to heavy volume of
artillery and mortar falling on to the territory. During this withdrawal
a number of soldiers went missing. However, by 1 p.m. on Wednesday the
troops were able to position a new defence line.
As dozens of soldiers wounded in the battle were flown to Colombo,
the rumours started to spread all over the country about the heavy
casualty rate and about the death toll. Even the Security Forces could
not give a correct figure as they could not make an exact casualty
figure by that time.
It was in the late evening that the Army Headquarters released that
43 soldiers were killed and 161 wounded soldiers were admitted to
hospitals. Another 33 were reported missing during the battle.
The pro-LTTE TamilNet announced that the LTTE had collected 20 bodies
of soldiers from the battlefront and announced a list of weapons
captured by the LTTE, but it did not included heavy weapons.
But the LTTE admitted the fact that the troops were dominating their
first defence line stretching nearly eight kilometres from Kilaly to
Kadolana.
The intercepted radio transmission of the LTTE confirmed that they
too had suffered heavily during the battle and declared 81 names of dead
Tiger cadres. But it was confirmed that nearly 150 Tiger cadres were
perished during the battle and a large number of wounded cadres are now
being treated at the Kilinochchi hospital.
Wrong figures by media
Two days after the incident the Army Headquarters confirmed that 82
soldiers including five officers were killed during the battle and that
31 out of the 33 reported missing were also confirmed killed during the
battle. Yet two more soldiers are still missing. Therefore, the huge
figures speculated by some media has become invalid now.
The troops are still holding the captured territory of the LTTE
despite speculations that they had withdrawn to their original defence
line.
The fact behind this battle was that there had been miscalculations
about the Tiger capabilities and about the assessment of the ground
ahead of the Security Forces Defences in Muhamalai.
If the troops conducted search operations ahead of the Security
Forces defence of the Muhamalai and Kilali defences the advancing troops
would not have faced such a large number of booby-traps of the LTTE. The
troops would have achieved the full objective of the operation if they
were able to flush out the Tiger cadres from their second line too.
If troops were able to achieve that task the future operations in
Jaffna, to march towards Kilinochchi via Elephant Pass will be an easy
task before the Security Forces as the LTTE has no major defences after
their second defence line.
Though troops are short of their objective they are now determined to
hold the ground and further establish their defences. Despite the
relatively high death toll and the casualty figures, the troops are
determined to go ahead with their plans in the Jaffna theatre to enter
into a decisive and crucial face of the Northern battle very soon.
Troops employ special tactics to capture Madhu
When Security Forces were engaged in a fierce battle in the Northern
front, well-trained small groups from the 572 Brigade in the Vavuniya
front were in surveillances around the Madhu Church area.

Commanding Officer 10 Sri Lanka Light Infantry Lt. Colonel
Jagath Kodithuwakku |
The 572 Brigade Commander Lt. Colonel. Senerath Bandara had given
instructions to these small teams not to make any move against the LTTE
even if they get a chance to assault them. The only weapon they could
use in their self-defence was the hand grenade which can be used within
a 30 metres radius.
The small teams were deployed into the Church area on April 20. Three
small groups deployed from three directions were observing what was
going on inside the Madhu Church. By that time the troops of the 572
Brigade had cut off the supply routes to the Church from Palampiddi side
from the North, Parappakandal road from the West and Madhu Road from the
South.
The incidents taking place on the Palampiddi road and Parappakandal
road gave the Tiger cadres a feeling that they have been surrounded by
the Security Forces.

Commanding Officer 7 Sri Lanka Sinha Regiment Lt. Colonel
Kithsiri Liyanage |
The small teams deployed by the 7 Sri Lanka Light Infantry Regiment,
7 Sri Lanka Sinha Regiment and 10 Sri Lanka Light Infantry Regiment
operating under the 572 Brigade were making these surveillances due to
their desire to capture Madhu Church area without firing a single
bullet.
The small teams observed that only 10 to 15 Tiger cadres were
operating within the Church premises by Tuesday afternoon. All the other
Tiger cadres had left the Church premises by that time. For the first
time it appeared that the LTTE had no proper leadership.
On Wednesday night the small teams observed that the remaining Tiger
cadres too were leaving the Church along with their belongings. But
troops strictly followed the instructions given to them. Then they
confirmed that the Church was no longer dominated by the LTTE. The
message was dispatched to the 572 Brigade Commander Lt. Colonel Senerath
Bandara.

Commanding Officer 7 Sri Lanka Light Infantry Regiment Lt.
Colonel Ranjith Abeyratne |
It was amidst the South heavily discussing the Jaffna situation that
two platoons of the 7 Sri Lanka Light Infantry Regiment under the
command of Lt. Colonel Ranjith Abeyratne were instructed to move into
the Church premises.
It was around 1 p.m. on Thursday that the Delta Company under Officer
Commanding (OC) Major Wasantha Bandara, and Charlie Company under
Officer Commanding Captain Dhammika Ratnayake entered the Church
premises.
They observed that the Tigers had abandoned the Church with troops of
the 7 Sri Lanka Sinha Regiment under the command of Lt. Colonel Kithsiri
Liyanage cutting off supplies to the church from the south along the
main Madhu Road while 10 Sri Lanka Light Infantry Regiment cutting off
the supplies from the Palampiddi side (North) while Special Forces
troops confronting the fleeing Tiger cadres in the area.

572 Brigade Commander
Lt. Colonel Senerath Bandara |
That was how the Security Forces following an arduous task fully
liberated the Madhu church area from the clutches of the LTTE without
firing a single bullet within the church precincts. The LTTE had to
withdraw from the area in the face of a military strategy adopted by the
Army to capture the area without firing a single shot.
With 57 Division in the Vavuniya battlefront reaching its target
successfully, the LTTE cadres will have to shift further towards North
if they are to protect their strongholds in the Wanni as the battle in
the Wanni is expected to enter a more decisive phase in the coming
months. |